NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/SR.2

# Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

15 February 2005
English
Original: French

**Third session**

**Summary record of the 2nd meeting**
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 26 April 2004, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman*: Mr. Pardohadiningrat ..... (Indonesia)

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General debate (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.*

1. **Mr. Dauth** (Australia) said recent events were a sharp reminder that the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation had not passed and that existing measures were insufficient. The value that the international community attached to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) could be seen in its near-universal membership. Australia called again upon India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to ensure strict controls on their nuclear materials, equipment, technology and knowledge. Developments since the Committee's previous session had highlighted the need to strengthen the NPT compliance and verification mechanisms. Australia and other countries were of the view that the additional protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, was now the safeguards standard required of non-nuclear-weapon States under article III, paragraph 1.

2. The nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a grave concern. NPT States parties must be united in calling for that country to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its programme, following the example of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which, after decades of isolation, was now poised to rejoin the international community following its decision to abandon its programme for weapons of mass destruction. Australia urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its announced NPT withdrawal and to comply fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

3. The extent of the proliferation network dismantled in Pakistan illustrated the critical importance of national controls over the production and export of sensitive technology, materials and know-how, and of international coordination in the application of national laws. Australia urged all NPT States parties to ensure that such controls were of a standard at least equivalent to the major nuclear export control regimes.

4. Australia welcomed the draft resolution of the Security Council on non-proliferation which would, among other steps, require States to enact effective controls, including export controls, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council should become more active in defending the nuclear non-proliferation norm and respond firmly when States breached their safeguards obligations. Such States should not enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation and NPT States parties should refrain from any nuclear cooperation with any State acting in violation of NPT provisions. Australia considered that a moratorium on the construction of new enrichment and processing plants should be applied pending the development of an appropriate framework to ensure that such projects are not diverted to military purposes.

5. The nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran remained a source of concern. IAEA reports had, since the Committee's previous session, brought to light serious and repeated failures by that country to comply with its safeguards obligations. Much remained to be done even though the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken steps towards greater transparency and cooperation with IAEA. Among other things, it must ratify the additional protocol and suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities.

6. Australia remained committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament as expressed in the 13 disarmament steps from the 2000 Review Conference. It acknowledged the progress made in that regard but, together with other non-nuclear-weapon States, expected nuclear-weapon States to continue giving effect to their disarmament obligations. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty) constituted a significant step towards nuclear disarmament since its implementation would enable the United States of America and the Russian Federation, within a decade, to reduce by two thirds the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. It was important for nuclear-weapon States to be as transparent as possible regarding their nuclear weapons policies and the action they were taking to fulfil their NPT obligations.

7. With 171 signatories and 112 ratifications, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a powerful international norm against nuclear testing. Australia urged States which had not yet done so to sign or ratify CTBT without delay. Pending its entry into force, existing moratoriums on nuclear testing must be maintained as should support for the development of its international monitoring system.

8. Australia was of the view that the adoption of a fissile material cut-off treaty would contribute to

nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and hoped that the Committee would reiterate support for the negotiation of such a treaty. It called upon China to join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons already announced by the other nuclear-weapon States, and for the nuclear-capable States outside NPT to join that moratorium.

9. The combined efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to work with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on its decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction stood as a case study of how diplomatic initiatives could reinforce the non-proliferation regime. The Proliferation Security Initiative developed to impede illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and missiles had evolved rapidly as a valuable reinforcement for NPT and other treaties on weapons of mass destruction. To date, more than 60 countries had indicated their support for that Initiative.

10. **Mr. Chowdhury** (Bangladesh) said that although for 35 years, NPT had been the centrepiece of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, its objective was still far from being achieved. Geopolitical events and national security doctrines had favoured the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Currently, NPT faced formidable challenges which could jeopardize its entire process and multilateral principles. In those grim circumstances, the 2005 Review Conference provided a fresh occasion for reaffirming a common political commitment and continuing the significant progress made in 1995 and 2000. As an NPT State party, Bangladesh had unconditionally abandoned any aspiration to nuclear weapons. Its firm commitment to the full implementation of NPT derived from its constitutional obligations to promote general and complete disarmament. As the first South Asian signatory of CTBT, and with a view to strict application of article III of NPT, Bangladesh had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA as well as an additional protocol, which demonstrated its unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

11. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was also an effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring such weapons. Bangladesh therefore attached the highest priority to the full and speedy application by nuclear-weapon States of article VI of NPT, leading to the total elimination of such weapons. Those States should also fulfil without delay the commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference, implement the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament and submit reports on the progress made to the third session of the Committee. It was equally important to continue the development of a universal and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference on Disarmament should endeavour to agree on a programme of work and set up an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to negotiate a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame, including a convention on nuclear weapons. Negotiations should also be initiated on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

12. Bangladesh noted that only three more signatures were needed for NPT to become genuinely universal and called upon those States which had not yet done so to sign the Treaty. It accorded great importance to the early entry into force of CTBT and its universal application. Nuclear testing of any kind constituted a threat to peace, security and the environment. Accordingly, Bangladesh urged those States which had not yet done so to sign or ratify the Treaty without delay and without conditions.

13. In South Asia, the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan were a source of legitimate concern to all the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region. Bangladesh welcomed the resumption of dialogue between those two countries and their decision to impose a moratorium on further nuclear testing. It firmly supported regional initiatives for nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures, particularly through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones freely decided on among the States concerned. In that regard, it welcomed the imminent establishment of such a zone in Central Asia, and would like to see similar zones in the Middle East and other regions of the world. The achievement of the goals set forth in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was equally important. So long as one country in that region, Israel, remained outside the non-proliferation regime and safeguards agreements, the region could not be rid of the threat of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

14. The universal application of safeguards agreements, including the model additional protocol, was essential for ensuring an effective verification regime. Bangladesh called upon States which had not yet done so to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA so as to strengthen further its capacity to verify compliance. It was troubling to see that more than 30 years after the entry into force of NPT, the legitimate right of its non-nuclear-weapon States parties to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes remained unfulfilled. Bangladesh therefore urged nuclear-weapon States to discharge forthwith their obligations under article IV of NPT.

15. **Mr. Jenie** (Indonesia) said that his delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by Malaysia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned and other States parties. NPT was widely acknowledged to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and had achieved near-universal adherence. The implementation of NPT was a matter for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The decisions and resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had marked a departure in the functioning of NPT, as did the 13 practical steps specified in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

16. While the emergence of new nuclear risks, particularly the development of new nuclear capabilities, the reassertion of strategic doctrines, first-use of such weapons and nuclear terrorism were certainly disturbing, it was heartening to note that the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States were continuing to comply fully with their obligations under the treaty. Nonetheless, NPT had fallen short of expectations, especially with regard to nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Little progress had been made to implement the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000. The inalienable right of access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy continued to be hampered by unilateral restrictions on nuclear-related exports. Also regrettable was the tendency to apply punitive measures against all States parties because of the actions of a few, as well as the undermining of the regime through the creation of mechanisms outside the NPT framework, which hampered attempts to strengthen the regime. The adoption of a legally binding multilateral instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would allay the security concerns of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States and would be a critical element in maintaining the principle of non-proliferation. It was also necessary to close the loopholes used by aspirant proliferators and non-State actors; in that regard, it was imperative to strengthen the role of IAEA.

17. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that his country associated itself with the statement made by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and the statement made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned and other States. South Africa advocated the preparation of a Chairperson's paper that would highlight issues, following the approach taken at the second session, which could then be recommended to the President of the 2005 Review Conference. The procedural arrangements should take into account the deliberations and results of previous sessions and include recommendations on an optimal organization of work, leaving it to the Review Conference to consider the substance of the issues. In that regard, the establishment of subsidiary bodies would be consistent with the 1995 and 2000 decisions on the strengthened review process which had led to the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and another on the Middle East.

18. On the issue of security assurances, NAC had submitted a paper containing the rationale for and the text of an agreement on that subject. Along with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, NAC had requested the Committee to allocate time for the consideration of that issue; South Africa strongly endorsed that proposal as well as the proposal for the establishment of a subsidiary body to give particular attention to the issue.

19. In the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the States parties had announced an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament and reiterated that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process was general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The accomplishments since then showed a blemished record: while additional protocols had been concluded, progress towards nuclear disarmament had been insufficient, particularly with regard to the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference. In contrast, the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had honoured and continued to honour their NPT obligations.

20. The problems confronting the NPT States parties spanned the full spectrum of the issues addressed in the Treaty. By continuing to emphasize some aspects relative to others, those problems were only being exacerbated. Those aspects were interlinked and could not be considered in isolation. Convinced that NPT remained an invaluable instrument for the achievement of international peace and security, South Africa hoped to contribute to the success of the forthcoming Review Conference.

21. **Mr. Balarezo** (Peru) said that his country was firmly committed to honouring its non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament commitments and was fully discharging its obligations under NPT and the agreements concluded at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Despite its shortcomings, NPT remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, which must be consolidated through multilateral action. Peru deplored the scant progress made in the application of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. The international community should revisit those steps as the most reliable means of making progress towards disarmament and non-proliferation, and endeavour to implement them. In that regard, Peru urged those countries that had not yet done so to ratify CTBT in order to secure its entry into force within the shortest possible time. In addition, an international, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of fissile material should be negotiated. That would not be possible until the inertia which had gripped the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral organ for disarmament for more than seven years, had been overcome. Accordingly, agreement must be reached on the programme of work of the Conference, particularly in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

22. Underscoring the need for universal application of the IAEA safeguards regime, he urged all States parties which had not yet done so to accede, as quickly as possible, to the relevant agreements. He recalled the seriousness of the stakes and highlighted the repeated failures of various nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament initiatives, in particular the lack of consensus on issues discussed in the Disarmament Commission and the inability to set a provisional agenda for a possible special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In conclusion, he called for strengthening the Treaty and speeding up its implementation at a time when new security doctrines not necessarily based on multilateralism seemed to be emerging.

23. **Mr. Kim Sam-hoon** (Republic of Korea) welcomed the decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to renounce its programmes for weapons of mass destruction and the dismantling of the Abdul Qadeer Khan procurement network. He hoped that the Libyan example would be emulated in other parts of the world. Despite that good news, however, the integrity and credibility of NPT had been challenged by recent cases of non-compliance and an announced withdrawal which revealed the limitations and loopholes of the Treaty. The challenges confronting NPT were dire enough to call into question the effectiveness and viability of the Treaty. They called for a concerted response by the international community as a whole. As a first step, the Treaty must be supplemented and strengthened in order to adapt it to twenty-first century realities. In that regard, the verification capabilities of IAEA must be strengthened through the universal application of the additional protocol, which the Republic of Korea had ratified on 19 February 2004 and which it urged those States parties which had not yet done so to sign and ratify as soon as possible.

24. His delegation supported the establishment of a universal system of export controls as well as the leading role played by the Nuclear Suppliers Group; it also recognized the need to control the transfer of sensitive fuel cycle technologies and materials in order to prevent proliferation. While welcoming the Security Council's efforts to combat the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related materials involving non-State actors, he pointed out that that issue had not been adequately addressed by the current non-proliferation regime. The withdrawal provision of NPT should be revisited and complemented with a view to preventing the "de-universalization" of the Treaty. In that connection, the Republic of Korea was open to any constructive proposal, including the idea of requiring the Security Council's approval for a withdrawal.

25. The ratification and entry into force of CTBT, as well as the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, should be accelerated as a matter of urgency. The moratoriums on nuclear testing must be maintained until CTBT entered into force.

26. In order to strengthen their authority with regard to the promotion of non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon

States must demonstrate greater vigour and resolve in fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference. His delegation welcomed the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty and hoped that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would make rapid progress towards nuclear disarmament.

27. At a time when a growing number of countries were mastering the technologies for the production of fissile materials and nuclear devices, export controls and the safeguards system could never be foolproof in deterring all proliferation. The root causes of proliferation must therefore be addressed, by reducing regional tension and fostering an environment conducive to world peace and security. With regard to security assurances, States parties which were complying fully with their obligations under the Treaty must be provided with negative security assurances and other incentives.

28. At the regional level, it was essential that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should make a commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all its nuclear programmes. The way in which the international community dealt with that issue would have enduring and far-reaching implications for the security of the Korean peninsula, North-East Asia and the rest of the world. Desiring to reach a peaceful resolution of the issue, his Government was working closely with interested parties within the framework of the Six-Party Talks and hoped that the next round of talks would lead to concrete results.

29. **Mr. Abdel-Moneim** (Egypt) said that the 2000 Review Conference had shown the nuclear-weapon States the way forward towards the total elimination of such weapons, but only minimal progress had been accomplished to date. In that regard, he pointed out that: (a) in spite of the adoption of unilateral and bilateral measures, some of which were legally binding, few nuclear weapons had been permanently eliminated and the international community did not have the resources to verify the scope of progress made in that regard; (b) nuclear weapons continued to be the cornerstone of many countries' strategies, whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons, and the possibility of the use of such weapons was currently more real than during the cold war. Furthermore, in certain nuclear-weapon States, research was progressing rapidly towards the development of nuclear capabilities which were easier to use in the theatre of operations; (c) during the previous 10 years, intellectual and political inertia had paralysed the multilateral disarmament mechanisms, as evidenced in particular by the fact that the international community was now openly asking not when the Conference on Disarmament would resume its work but whether it should continue to exist; (d) there had been a slackening in the implementation of certain commitments made only a few years earlier, and certain parties were completely abandoning their commitments, which damaged the credibility of the NPT review process.

30. Security assurances must be provided which were both comprehensive and compulsory in order to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the dangers inherent to such weapons. His delegation had in the past called for the establishment of a legally binding agreement in that area which could take the form of an annex to NPT. That issue must be closely examined by the Committee with a view to its consideration at the 2005 Review Conference. The strengthening of the capacity of the international community to deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and with cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty was one of the principal challenges which must be taken up in the near future and could be ignored only at the risk of paying a very heavy price. A balance must be struck among all the obligations arising out of the Treaty, whether with regard to non-proliferation, the elimination of nuclear weapons, the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes or promotion of the universality of the Treaty.

31. On the question of the universality of NPT, the Middle East issue and the recommendations made in that regard by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences must be taken up, because the current precarious situation in the Middle East would continue to undermine the credibility of NPT so long as only one country of the region, namely Israel, remained outside the scope of the Treaty and its obligations. The 2000 Review Conference had clearly and firmly reiterated that Israel must adhere to NPT and open its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards regime, which would constitute a step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. His delegation had submitted to the Committee a report describing the measures taken with a view to the

implementation of those recommendations as provided for in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. It associated itself with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in requesting that a subsidiary mechanism should be established at the 2005 Review Conference with a view to identifying ways and means of implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as well as the recommendations adopted in that regard at the 2000 Review Conference. Failure to meet commitments made would not contribute to political stability in the Middle East or provide a sound basis for a security framework for the countries of the region. Over the past 30 years, Egypt had repeatedly called attention to the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and to the need to consolidate security in that region in a balanced manner and on an equitable basis of rights and obligations of all the countries of the region. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East depended on Israel's accession to NPT. That was the issue before the current session of the Committee, which would be raised next at the 2005 Review Conference.

32. His delegation believed in the importance of NPT and its role in the maintenance of international security. Real progress had been made in the area of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but efforts must continue to achieve the elimination of such weapons and ensure the universality of the Treaty, without upsetting the balance between the rights and obligations set out therein which underpinned the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

33. **Mr. Faessler** (Switzerland) recalled recent developments, both positive and worrying, since the Committee's second session in 2003, and reviewed the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He also noted the discovery of an extremely dangerous black market for nuclear technology, thanks to numerous verification activities by IAEA in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and following the admissions made by the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Switzerland deplored the decision by the United States Congress to abrogate the 1993 law blocking the allocation of funds for scientific research in the area of low-yield nuclear weapons as well as its decision to allocate funds for the reactivation of test sites. He nevertheless stressed that the Moscow Treaty, concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, was a positive development.

34. Those developments illustrated three of the serious problems facing the Treaty: its lack of influence on the activities of countries which had nuclear weapons but were not parties to the Treaty, the lack of will on the part of certain States parties to fully meet their obligations and the difficulty of acting during serious proliferation crises. In addition to those problems, there was the terrorist threat. In order to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, his delegation proposed to put forward specific measures to advance the debate and strengthen the goals of the Treaty.

35. Efforts to universalize the Treaty must continue, by promoting nuclear disarmament and urging non-States parties to adhere to the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States parties must assume a collective responsibility by putting pressure on non-States parties to cooperate with IAEA or by discontinuing their nuclear cooperation with such States. With respect to the specific measures recently proposed for strengthening IAEA, Switzerland supported the ratification by all States parties of an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements with IAEA. An additional protocol would enter into force in Switzerland in 2004. The widening of proliferation was not unconnected with the fact that nuclear-weapon States had still not entirely fulfilled their nuclear disarmament commitments under article VI of the Treaty; there was a need to strengthen the 1995 Principles and Objectives and the 13 steps adopted in 2003. Given that the 2000 Review Conference had recognized the legitimacy of legally binding negative security assurances and had called for recommendations to be made in that regard at the 2005 Review Conference, Switzerland was in favour of an urgent recommendation giving States parties a mandate to negotiate a new international instrument. Having regard for the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Switzerland was opposed to proposals for a general ban on exports of certain technologies to countries which did not already have them. However, it was in favour of integrating into the domestic legislation of all States parties provisions criminalizing illegal activities in the area of nuclear technology.

36. Switzerland supported initiatives to strengthen the verification of the Treaty, to organize annual conferences of States parties, and to further develop the

instrument of declarations. Lastly, while recognizing that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament required the negotiation and adoption of legally binding multinational instruments, Switzerland did not with to exclude other, complementary initiatives. To that end, it had joined the Group of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

37. **Mr. Mine** (Japan) observed that 2005, the year of the NPT Review Conference, would also mark the sixtieth anniversary of the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan called upon all States parties to reaffirm their commitment to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in order to ensure that such disasters were never repeated — a desire shared by the general public and the international community. The discovery of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's underground network was a recent example of the difficulties experienced by the nuclear non-proliferation regime and highlighted the need for further strengthening that regime. The Committee should carefully consider the adoption of specific measures, such as the strengthening and universalization of IAEA safeguards, the physical protection of nuclear material, and the strengthening of export controls. Japan also attached great importance to the strengthening of non-proliferation efforts in Asia, and had been contributing to that process.

38. Japan continued to urge all nuclear-weapon States to implement concrete measures to achieve nuclear disarmament, and reminded them that nearly all countries had made a commitment to renounce nuclear weapons. Japan welcomed the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and hoped that the two States parties to that Treaty would ensure its full implementation. Nonetheless, it regretted that no progress had been made regarding the entry into force of CTBT or the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty despite the agreements reached to that end. At the third conference on facilitating the entry into force of CTBT, held in 2003, Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed the importance of the early entry into force of CTBT, as well as the maintenance of the moratoriums on nuclear test explosions pending its entry into force.

39. Japan was concerned at the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from NPT and its refusal to accept the IAEA safeguards agreement. The international community urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract those decisions immediately, and Japan called upon that country to dismantle all its nuclear programmes in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Japan welcomed the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to act in accordance with the additional protocol, pending its entry into force. It hoped that the Islamic Republic of Iran would respond to all the outstanding requests contained in the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, ratify the additional protocol without delay, and continue and intensify cooperation with IAEA, in particular by promptly providing the requested detailed information. Japan also welcomed the decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon all its weapons of mass destruction programmes and called upon it to ratify and fully implement the additional protocol as soon as possible. It strongly hoped that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would follow that example.

40. His delegation stressed the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for young people. As part of its own education efforts, Japan had invited disarmament educators from overseas. His delegation would submit to the Committee a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education, and encouraged other delegations to become sponsors and to share information on their efforts in that field at the 2005 Review Conference. To that end, Japan would submit an additional working paper to the Committee on its own efforts in the field.

41. **Mr. Fayssal Mekdad** (Syrian Arab Republic) endorsed the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as that made by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group. The nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime and the nuclear weapons elimination regime were interdependent and necessary for achieving the main objective of NPT, which was the elimination of nuclear weapons within the framework of an effective international monitoring system. NPT was still not universal, because a number of States had not yet adhered to it, including States with nuclear facilities, which were therefore not subject to the IAEA safeguards regime. If it was to be credible and universal, the Treaty must not be used to impose restrictions on certain countries in order to serve the interests of other countries. A distinction

should no longer be made between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties; in that way, all States would have the same rights and the same obligations. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States should refrain from dealing with non-States parties to the Treaty, especially States that ignored international instruments and were strengthening their military nuclear capacities. It was obvious that such a situation compromised the universality of the Treaty and undermined the commitments that nuclear-weapon States had made to work towards the elimination and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

42. The adoption of the resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 Review Conference demonstrated States parties' concern about the situation that prevailed in the Middle East due to the presence in that region of nuclear facilities that were not subject to the international monitoring system. The international community needed to recognize that there was little chance of achieving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as long as Israel continued to be alone in possessing military nuclear capacities.

43. In view of the imbalance existing between the respect shown by all Arab countries for their obligations and the danger represented by Israel's military and civilian nuclear facilities, and in order to strengthen the universality, credibility and transparency of the Treaty and eliminate threats linked to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, his delegation wished to make the following points:

(a) The Committee should devote part of its time to the modalities for implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and should expressly demand that Israel adhere to NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place all its nuclear facilities under the international monitoring system by signing a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA;

(b) In accordance with the provisions of article I of NPT, nuclear-weapon States must undertake not to transfer to Israel nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices;

(c) Efforts must be made to ensure that all States parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, and in particular depositary States, fully implemented the provisions of the aforementioned decision and developed a reliable mechanism that would make it possible to achieve the objectives set forth in the decision;

(d) Certain nuclear-weapon States must stop avoiding their Treaty obligations and refrain from justifying the existence of Israel's nuclear programme and arsenal.

44. Moreover, his Government:

(a) Called upon all nuclear-weapon States to comply with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty;

(b) Urged nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations by making serious efforts to eliminate their nuclear weapons within the framework of a rigorous and effective international monitoring system, in the interests of international peace and security;

(c) Stressed the need to establish an effective mechanism that would facilitate implementation of the measures set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference;

(d) Proposed that serious negotiations should be initiated immediately with a view to drafting a legally binding document that offered comprehensive security assurances, which were both balanced and unconditional, to non-nuclear-weapon States.

45. With respect to the rules of procedure, the Committee should adopt those used at the 2000 Review Conference and, at the conclusion of its work, should decide upon operational measures for adoption at the 2005 Review Conference.

46. **Ms. Reyes** (Venezuela) said that her delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and reaffirmed its support for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. As a founding member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which, following the accession of Cuba, would establish in Latin America the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, Venezuela welcomed the progress made towards the establishment of such zones, which would contribute to the promotion of a climate of international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States must negotiate in good faith, in accordance with article VI of NPT, with

a view to reducing their nuclear arsenals in the interests of peace. Although she welcomed the fact that 189 countries were parties to the NPT, she stressed that the Treaty must become truly universal, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference.

47. Her Government believed that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had great strategic importance for the issue of nuclear disarmament and arms control. It had adhered to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and hoped that the General Assembly, at its next session, would adopt a resolution establishing a link with the United Nations. Having ratified CTBT in 2002, her Government advocated a continued moratorium on nuclear tests. It supported IAEA, whose role was to monitor full implementation of NPT and the safeguards regime, promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthen the technological and physical security of radioactive sources. Accordingly, it had placed at the disposal of IAEA and CTBTO two seismographic stations in the context of the international system for monitoring the implementation of the Treaty; it called on countries which had not yet done so to sign or ratify the Treaty.

48. Her Government was concerned at the escalation of violence and tension in the Middle East, which constituted a threat to international peace and security, hoped that a solution to the conflict would be found in accordance with related Security Council resolutions and in full respect for international law and supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region as a way of creating trust. It believed in multilateralism as a mechanism for negotiations and was opposed to the unilateral use of force and to preventive war as a means of settling political and cultural problems because they exacted a heavy toll on the poor and disadvantaged.

49. **Mr. Meyer** (Canada) said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty, non-compliance by the Islamic Republic of Iran with its obligations, which raised doubts about that country's real intentions, the violations which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had admitted to having committed and the black market in nuclear technologies in which Mr. Khan and citizens and entities from several States parties to the Treaty were involved had made the past year a sombre one. He called on the States parties to react in order to defend the Treaty, which was the foundation for international security, by making the additional protocol a mandatory verification standard at the 2005 Review Conference, with a view to creating a reinforced system to ensure that the obligations arising out of the Treaty were truly respected. The right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had concomitant obligations, which guaranteed security. It was essential that the nuclear-weapon States should reduce their arsenal in a progressive, systematic, irreversible, transparent and measurable manner, thus proving that they were respecting their obligations. The 13 practical steps set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference constituted a significant action plan against which to measure progress, but in many cases it would not be possible to move forward without relaunching multilateral disarmament efforts in the context of the Conference on Disarmament, which would provide an opportunity to demonstrate to States which were not parties to the Treaty that security was not dependent on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

50. Canada believed that the time had come to strengthen the Treaty and bring it in line with comparable international agreements in order to protect adequately the interests of the States parties; the Treaty's institutional deficit should be remedied by reconfiguring the preparatory process into a series of annual general conferences of the States parties to consider the status of implementation of the Treaty and take decisions as required. The conferences would remain within the six-week time frame devoted to the preparatory process. The bureau of the review conference would be reconstituted as a standing bureau, the members of which would be elected at the review conference and would serve until the next quinquennial review conference. The bureau would be empowered to convene extraordinary sessions of the general conference of States parties when a situation threatening the integrity or viability of the Treaty arose, such as when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided to withdraw from the Treaty in January 2003. That would mean that States parties would not have to wait five years before being able to exercise their decision-making powers and would make the Treaty more effective. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs would continue to provide secretarial support within the existing resources allocated to the Treaty. His delegation believed that its suggestions concerning the regular submission of reports and increased access for civil society would complement the annual general conferences, since all the measures proposed would

serve to reinforce the principle of "permanence with accountability" which underlay the decision taken in 1995 to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

51. **Mr. Kazykhanov** (Kazakhstan) said that NPT was still a key instrument at a time when a number of countries and terrorist groups were trying to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Non-proliferation and disarmament were complementary, and the Treaty was the only multilateral instrument obligating States parties to adopt nuclear disarmament measures. A balance had to be ensured between the obligations of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States in order to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The disarmament process should be carried out within the framework of legally binding instruments. Negotiations should therefore be launched on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to negotiate a phased programme for total nuclear disarmament. Kazakhstan urged all States which had not yet done so to accede to NPT so as to give it a universal character, and it strongly supported the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference. It believed that States should strengthen and universalize the non-proliferation regimes governing weapons of mass destruction and the corresponding verification mechanisms, and urged them to give careful consideration to the Canadian proposal for remedying the institutional deficit of the Treaty. Recognizing that global partnerships were an effective tool, Kazakhstan supported the Security Council's initiative concerning the adoption of a resolution on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and called on all States to take measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring such weapons or their components, specifically by tightening controls and enhancing transparency.

52. Kazakhstan, which was still coping with the grave effects of the nuclear tests conducted in its territory, underscored the importance of speeding up the ratification and entry into force of CTBT; for its part, it had put its seismic control stations at the disposal of the international monitoring system. His Government supported the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and was actively involved in the negotiations on the question in Central Asia. It attached great importance to the observance and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime, which made it possible to prevent nuclear material from being diverted for military or illicit purposes, and invited all States to join it in signing the additional protocol. Kazakhstan had been a member since 2000 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, thus testifying to its commitment to comply with internationally accepted standards. It was convinced that a militarization of outer space would have irreversible consequences, and regretted the fact that no action had been taken on the request it had made in 2000 for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, despite the fact that it participated in international space programmes, possessed scientific and technological capacity in the area of missile and space systems, and was actively strengthening its export control system.

53. **Mr. Ivanou** (Belarus) said that his delegation welcomed the accession of Cuba and Timor-Leste to NPT and Cuba's decision to become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and invited all States with nuclear facilities which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty. It deplored the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to denounce the Treaty, but believed that the question should be settled peacefully at the bilateral and multilateral levels, taking due account of the legitimate interests of all parties. In keeping with its policy on international security, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament and arms control, Belarus was a party to numerous international instruments. It had accordingly concluded an IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1995, and had not held any nuclear weapons in its territory since 1996. In 2000, it had become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was an indication of its intention to respect international export control regimes. Belarus believed that in order to achieve the ultimate goal of NPT, namely, the destruction of nuclear weapons, a realistic, balanced and gradual approach had to be taken, based on collective decision-making mechanisms, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The strengthening and strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty were a crucial element in the struggle against terrorism, and there had to be a greater focus on nuclear terrorism, transfers of nuclear materials and accounting for them, and the protection of nuclear facilities.

54. Belarus attached great importance to the entry into force of CTBT and invited all States which had not yet done so to accede to it, so as to put an end to

nuclear tests and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It found it encouraging that a number of countries which had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty were respecting the moratorium on nuclear tests. It urged the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations without delay on the questions of halting the production of fissile material for military purposes, nuclear disarmament, negative security guarantees and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Belarus believed that nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with practical measures in order to create a climate of confidence, contribute to regional security and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and it therefore supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South-East Asia, Central Asia and other regions. Likewise, it welcomed the signing of the Moscow Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. Furthermore, it attached great importance to the measures taken under article IV of NPT concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It considered that although significant progress had been made in terms of nuclear safety, the issues of the reprocessing and disposal of nuclear fuel and the dismantling of nuclear plants were far from resolved.

55. **Mr. Cserveny** (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that the events of the past year had placed stress on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and arms control regime and shown that it needed to be strengthened without delay. As an independent and objective verification body, IAEA played a crucial role by ensuring that nuclear activities were not misused for military or illicit purposes. The Agency therefore deplored the slow progress of States in subscribing to the strengthened safeguards regime, which helped it in its efforts to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Currently, 44 States parties to NPT had still not signed safeguards agreements. Seven years after the adoption by the Board of Governors of IAEA of the Model Protocol Additional to Agreements between States and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards, only 83 States parties to the Treaty had signed additional protocols and only 39 of them had taken the necessary measures for their entry into force.

56. Since the Agency had been unable to conduct verifications in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since December 2002, the situation in that country was extremely worrying. The Agency hoped that any future settlement of the crisis would give it the necessary authority and resources to be able to verify the nature of that State's nuclear programme. As for Iraq, the Agency was prepared to resume its activities under the mandate of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions which it had been unable to carry out since 17 March 2003, unless the Council should decide otherwise. The Agency had also continued to discharge its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement concluded by Iraq under the Treaty. In the four reports submitted to the Board of Governors over the past year, the Director General of the Agency had drawn attention to the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement, which had led the Board to adopt three resolutions on the subject. Since October 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran had shown greater openness and transparency, and the Agency was working to verify that the information provided by that State on its past and current activities was correct and complete. The Islamic Republic of Iran had signed the additional protocol in December 2003 and had undertaken to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities as a confidence-building measure. The Agency was currently verifying that that State was fulfilling its commitments. It also had to verify the origin of the enriched uranium particles found at a number of locations, and find out how the Islamic Republic of Iran had come into possession of a P-2 uranium enrichment centrifuge technology. In December 2003, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had announced that it was eliminating all programmes for the production of internationally proscribed weapons, including nuclear weapons, thereby recognizing that it had for many years been contravening the provisions of its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Board of Governors had brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council, and the Libyan authorities were cooperating closely with the Agency to enable it to gain a full picture of the Libyan nuclear programme. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had signed an additional protocol in March 2004.

57. IAEA believed that measures must be taken to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and deal with new threats, particularly international terrorism. It urged all States to sign the additional protocol, the sine qua non for an effective verification regime. It was also necessary to broaden and tighten controls on exports of nuclear technology that could be diverted to other uses, while avoiding restrictions on the sharing of technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The ideal would be a universal, multilateral system based on commonly shared norms. The granting or denial of authorization to export should be brought to the Agency's attention. Lastly, there should be better controls over operations involving uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and the disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste; they were a veritable Achilles heel of the current non-proliferation regime, and should be concentrated in a limited number of regional centres. At the same time, it would be necessary to make sure that commercial competitiveness was preserved, prevent the disclosure of sensitive information, and ensure the uninterrupted supply of fuel cycle services. The Agency planned to address those issues in the near future, and invited States parties to the Treaty to incorporate the recommendations on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime into the report of the Committee to be submitted to the 2005 Review Conference.

58. IAEA had continued its work in relation to verification mechanisms to be established in the framework of the Trilateral Initiative of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the Agency itself, which was the subject of the eighth practical step mentioned in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The legal framework which had been developed could be used as the basis for negotiations on verification agreements, but the Agency had yet to receive a request to that effect from the States concerned. The Agency was also closely following the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and was ready to play a verification role should such a treaty be concluded.

59. Established by IAEA, the Chernobyl Forum was designed to provide information to the people affected by the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, to facilitate the implementation of victim assistance programmes and to review the environmental aspects of decommissioning the plant. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had urged IAEA to promote nuclear safety in all its aspects and called on States parties to the Treaty to take national, regional and international steps to increase awareness about the importance of nuclear safety and security. Progress had been made in the area of nuclear safety, as States adopted increasingly strict measures for radiation protection and nuclear security had been significantly improved over the previous two years.

60. Nuclear security was first and foremost the responsibility of States, and a comprehensive approach to nuclear security must involve all States. IAEA assisted States in several areas and in many ways, including evaluation missions and training workshops. It also cooperated with the European Commission, the United Nations system and other international organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization and the European Police Office and had focused its technical cooperation programme on the areas of research and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, as envisaged in article IV of the Treaty, with the goal of promoting the sustainable development priorities of recipient countries. However, the Agency required sufficient human and financial resources to meet the objectives set forth in the Treaty and in its Statute, whether in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament, nuclear technology, nuclear safety and security or nuclear verification. The review of the activities undertaken in 2003 showed clearly that IAEA was being increasingly called on for assistance and must confront new challenges.

61. **Ms. Bethel** (Bahamas), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), reaffirmed the commitment of those States to the implementation of NPT and called on States parties to meet fully their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the commitments that they had made at the 2000 Review Conference. Very limited progress had been made in the four years following the adoption of the Final Document and the practical steps for its implementation. Nevertheless, the near universality of the Treaty should continue to be a source of optimism and a sign of common ground regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons. The fact that the international community had recently turned its attention to the very real danger of the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by non-State actors, including terrorists, should not deter the world from the agreed goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

62. The accession of all CARICOM member States to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, in a densely populated region, showed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They therefore encouraged other States to make efforts to create such zones. Since the

elimination of nuclear tests was a critical element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process, the CARICOM States called for a renewed commitment to promoting the entry into force of CTBT, which had not yet been signed and ratified by enough countries. CARICOM welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by Belize on 26 March 2004 and the conclusion of a cooperation agreement between CTBTO and the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first of its kind.

63. The States members of CARICOM were particularly committed to the issue of nuclear safety and, to that end, had all concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA and were in the process of signing additional protocols. However, they believed that the most important nuclear safety issue was still the transboundary movement of radioactive materials. While welcoming the endorsement by the 2000 Review Conference of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, they remained gravely concerned by the trans-shipment of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea, which threatened the environmental and economic sustainability of the small island developing States of the region. By recognizing that concern, the international community acknowledged its responsibility to protect the marine space of coastal countries from the risks inherent in the transport of such materials. The CARICOM States were encouraged in that respect by the efforts made by IAEA, including the adoption of various instruments, and called on all States to implement them fully. They recognized the need for security of nuclear materials and the right of States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under article VI of NPT but affirmed that such considerations must not be inimical to the sustainable development of other States. They continued to call for the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework to promote State responsibility in the area of disclosure, prior informed consent and compensation in the event of accidents.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*